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The Fourth Amendment, a Woman’s Right: An 
Inquiry into Whether State-Implemented 
Transvaginal Ultrasounds Violate the Fourth 
Amendment’s Reasonable Search Provision 
Janelle T. Wilke* 
INTRODUCTION 
Virginia’s Governor Bob McDonnel once explained that his 
decision to call for amendments to Virginia’s pre-abortion 
transvaginal ultrasound bill was based on advice from his 
attorney that “mandatory invasive requirements might run afoul 
of [the] Fourth Amendment.”1 
Within the past few years, legislation has been enacted in 
several states, including Texas, which requires women to 
undergo an ultrasound before they are able to receive an 
abortion.2 Though some have been repealed, amended, or 
enjoined from enforcement,3 a common thread within these 
 
 * J.D., Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2015. The author 
wishes to thank her family for their unconditional support and encouragement, 
specifically her mother and father for helping to develop and contemplate the focus of this 
research. The author also thanks Professor Rita Barnett and the Chapman Law Review 
editorial staff for their assistance with this Comment. 
 1 Lucy Madison, McDonnel Says He Had Legal Concerns About Virginia Ultrasound 
Bill, CBS NEWS (Feb. 24, 2012, 6:02 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mcdonnell-says-
he-had-legal-concerns-about-virginia-ultrasound-bill/.  
 2 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2014) (effective Sept. 1, 
2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (2014) (effective July 1, 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, 
§ 1-738.3d (2014), invalidated by Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013); S. 1387, 61st Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2012) (as 
passed by Senate, Mar. 19, 2012) (withdrawn Mar. 28, 2012), available at http://www. 
legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2012/S1387.pdf; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2014) 
(effective Oct. 28, 2011), invalidated by Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 609 
(M.D.N.C. 2014) (holding the act violated the First Amendment); see also Joseph Serna, 
Legal Attacks on Abortion Getting Some Victories but Losses Too, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 
2014, 7:18 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-abortion-laws-2014 
0315-story.html (“22 states enacted 70 abortion restrictions in 2013.”).  
 3 See Beth Kropf, Comment, What’s Harm Got to Do with It? The Unintended 
Consequences of Texas’s Ultrasound Law, 13 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 353, 367 (2013) 
(“[T]he laws in Oklahoma and North Carolina are temporarily enjoined from 
enforcement.”); Nicholas D. Kristof, When States Abuse Women, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2012, 
at SR11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/opinion/sunday/kristof-when-
states-abuse-women.html (noting that Virginia’s “proposal that would have required 
vaginal ultrasounds before an abortion was modified to require only abdominal 
ultrasounds”). 
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statutes requires an abortion physician to perform an ultrasound 
prior to the abortion, whereby the image, heartbeat, physical 
characteristics, and dimensions of the fetus are relayed back to 
the female patient.4 
Many of these same statutes commonly require physicians to 
not only present, but also expound upon the readings derived 
from the ultrasound; for these reasons, the statutes have been 
challenged on First and Fifth Amendment grounds thus far.5 Yet 
no one has formally questioned whether the method of 
administering the ultrasound, executed in an attempt to comply 
with the given statute, constitutes an unreasonable search under 
the Fourth Amendment.  
The Fourth Amendment typically protects individuals6 from 
unreasonable searches administered by the State.7 Here, since 
the statutes mentioned have explicitly mandated the 
pre-abortion ultrasounds be transvaginal, while others have been 
ambiguous as to what method must be applied in conducting the 
ultrasonography,8 the method used for the transvaginal 
ultrasounds—that is, inserting a probe into a woman’s vagina—
could be viewed as constituting an unreasonable search. Texas’ 
current statute is among the more ambiguous of these new, 
invasive abortion statutes in that it fails to explicitly define what 
kind of ultrasound the physician is to administer in order to 
 
 4 See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR 
ULTRASOUND (2014), available at https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ 
RFU.pdf.  
 5 See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 
580 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding the challenged provisions did not violate the First 
Amendment since Texas’ abortion statute was “sustainable under Casey” and was “within 
the State’s power to regulate the practice of medicine”); Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (holding 
Oklahoma’s challenged abortion provision was facially unconstitutional); Stuart, 992 F. 
Supp. 2d at 609 (holding provisions of North Carolina’s “Right to Know Act,” that 
mandated physicians describe fetal images for a woman seeking an abortion, was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
 6 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”). 
 7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 8 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (2014) (effective July 1, 2012) (explicitly 
requiring the physician to perform a “fetal transabdominal ultrasound” image on the 
patient), and OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d (2014) (allowing the physician and patient a 
choice between either an abdominal or a transvaginal ultrasound), invalidated by Nova 
Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013), with 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2014) (noting only that the physician provide an “obstetric 
real-time view” of the fetus), invalidated by Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 609 
(M.D.N.C. 2014), and S. 1387, 61st Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2012) (as passed by 
Senate, Mar. 19, 2012) (withdrawn Mar. 28, 2012), available at http://www.legislature. 
idaho.gov/legislation/2012/S1387.pdf (presenting ambiguity as to which method of 
ultrasound should be utilized by the physician).  
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comply with the statute—transvaginal or abdominal.9 Texas’ 
statute merely mandates that a licensed physician perform an 
ultrasound on the patient, in a way that will display “the 
sonogram images in a quality consistent with current medical 
practice,” whereby the dimensions of the embryo or fetus can be 
described, the presence of internal organs can be determined, and 
the fetus’ heartbeat can be amplified to become audible.10 
However, a more thorough investigation of the effect of 
Texas’ statute in practice reveals transvaginal ultrasounds are 
actually being utilized by abortion clinics as a result of 
physicians’ attempts to comply with the statute.11 This is because 
during the time at which most abortions are administered 
(during a woman’s first trimester), transvaginal ultrasounds are 
usually used; transvaginal ultrasounds are the most accurate 
and acute method for detecting the fetus’ heartbeat, determining 
viability, and providing images of the fetus, early in pregnancy.12 
These details, difficult to clearly obtain through an abdominal 
ultrasound at such an early stage of pregnancy, are exactly what 
the statute requires be provided to the patient before her 
abortion.13 Thus, Texas’ statute forces an abortion physician to 
 
 9 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2014) (effective Sept. 1, 
2011). 
 10 Id.  
 11 See Kristof, supra note 3 (“[S]he first must typically endure an ultrasound probe 
inserted into her vagina. Then she listens to the audio thumping of the fetal heartbeat 
and watches the fetus on an ultrasound screen.”). 
 12 See Ultrasound: Sonogram, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, http://americanpregnancy.org/ 
prenataltesting/ultrasound.html (last updated Mar. 2006) (explaining that there are 
“basically seven different ultrasound exams, but the principle [sic] process is the same). 
“The different types of procedures include: transvaginal scans . . . [whereby] [s]pecially 
designed probe transducers are used inside the vagina to generate sonogram 
images . . . [m]ost often used during the early stages of pregnancy.” Id.; Erik Eckholm, 
Ultrasound: A Pawn in the Abortion Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, at SR4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/sunday-review/ultrasound-a-pawn-in-the-abortion-wa 
rs.html?pagewanted=all (“In the first trimester, when most abortions take place, that 
requires a vaginal probe, not the ‘jelly on the belly’ abdominal scans done later in the 
pregnancy, when the fetus is larger.”); Kropf, supra note 3, at 377 (explaining that 
transabdominal ultrasounds are less sensitive, and as a result one more week is usually 
needed in order to show features that are normally visible with a transvaginal ultrasound 
at that time). 
 13 See HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.012; see also Ultrasound: Sonogram, supra note 12 
(“Heartbeats are best detected with transvaginal ultrasounds early in pregnancy.”); 
DANIELLE MAZZA, WOMEN’S HEALTH IN GENERAL PRACTICE 95–96 (2d ed. 2011) 
(concluding that a transvaginal ultrasound is often undertaken to date the pregnancy 
correctly); Kate Sheppard, Mandatory Transvaginal Ultrasounds: Coming Soon to a State 
Near You, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 5, 2012), www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/03/trans 
vaginal-ultrasounds-coming-soon-state-near-you (“Most abortions take place within 
12 weeks after a woman becomes pregnant. And if the woman has been pregnant for eight 
weeks or less, conducting an ultrasound generally requires the doctor to insert a probe in 
a woman’s vagina in order to actually see or hear anything.”). 
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adhere to legislation that requires the collection of details during 
a time in pregnancy when successful compliance with the statute 
would require transvaginal ultrasounds to be utilized. 
It only seems natural that such intrusive legislation would 
create concern regarding whether the State is overstepping its 
boundaries by implementing a law that essentially requires a 
physical State intrusion into the developing womb of a patient.14 
As seen most clearly within the statutes themselves, states with 
this type of legislation have argued that the purpose of the 
statute is to provide the patient with adequate informed 
consent.15 In other words, by giving the patient as much accurate 
and detailed information as possible through the procedure, the 
State’s argument is that a patient is receiving the most 
information the State can provide, through the use of the 
ultrasound, in order to facilitate a patient’s complete 
understanding of the abortion procedure and its consequences. 
The question posed for consideration here is, given the State’s 
argument that the statute is aimed at providing informed 
consent, if challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds for the 
invasive method with which the ultrasounds are being 
performed, would the United States Supreme Court find Texas’ 
statute violates the Fourth Amendment? That is, does it impose 
an unreasonable search on the patient when a transvaginal 
ultrasound is administered? Considering the legal framework 
governing Fourth Amendment inquiries, as well as the 
significant interests involved in particular searches performed on 
individuals, if an individual were to fight state authority and 
 
 14 See John W. Whitehead, There Is Nothing Constitutional About State-Mandated 
Transvaginal Ultrasounds, HUFF. POST (Feb. 24, 2012, 10:36 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/john-w-whitehead/transvaginal-ultrasounds_b_1293645.html (“[R]equiring doctors 
to carry out such invasive probes on a woman without her consent, thereby intruding 
upon the physician-patient relationship and reducing doctors to agents of the state, 
violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against searches by government agents.”); 
see also Danielle C. Le Jeune, Comment, An “Exception”-Ally Difficult Situation: Do the 
Exceptions, or Lack Thereof, to the “Speech-and-Display Requirements” for Abortion 
Invalidate Their Use as Informed Consent?, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 521, 544 (2014) (“The 
speech-and-display requirements do more than simply inform women of the risks and 
alternatives of the [abortion]. These requirements force physicians to ‘physically speak 
and show the state’s non-medical message to patients unwilling to hear or see.’ [In] no 
other procedure must physicians provide such graphic detail on what happens to the 
body.”). 
 15 See generally HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.012; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (2014) 
(effective July 1, 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d (2014), invalidated by Nova Health 
Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013); S. 1387, 61st 
Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2012) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 19, 2012) (withdrawn Mar. 
28, 2012), available at http://www.legislature. idaho.gov/legislation/2012/S1387.pdf; N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2014) (effective Oct. 28, 2011), invalidated by Stuart v. Loomis, 
992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 609 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (holding the act violated the First Amendment).  
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challenge Texas’ statute, it is not immediately clear whether 
state authority would triumph in the debate. This Comment will 
explore that uncertainty. 
Part I of this Comment will address key precedent for 
abortion cases and the rationale used by the Court to justify 
physical state intrusion in some instances. The specific 
legislation in question, and the constitutional challenges that it 
has been assailed with to date, will follow. Finally, the section 
will conclude that the Fourth Amendment is indeed implicated 
by Texas’ legislation, even though the statute does not contain 
evidentiary aims for criminal investigatory purposes. 
Part II will explore the Fourth Amendment and how it has 
been applied to bodily intrusions in the past. This illustration 
will begin by explaining how the Court engages possible Fourth 
Amendment violations in deciding whether or not the 
governmental action is unreasonable. Part II will also detail how 
the “reasonableness” inquiry requires a balancing test in 
weighing the State’s interests in the procedure constituting a 
“search” against the privacy interests of the individual 
undergoing the search. 
With this jurisprudence guiding the way, Part III will 
further explore the reasonableness inquiry in connection with 
arguments the Court could consider in weighing the State’s 
interests in the legislation against the individual’s privacy 
interests. Finally, Part IV will conclude as to whether or not 
Texas’ legislation might run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.  
Importantly, this is not a “pro-life” or “pro-choice” centered 
article. This Comment does not aim to advocate for either result 
to the question posed, but simply to explore the procedural 
history, case law, and arguments the Court is likely to consider if 
presented with a Fourth Amendment challenge in this area of 
law.  
I. A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S ABORTION LAWS 
Before a discussion concerning the actual language of Texas’ 
statute takes place, it is important to consider two foundational 
cases that have set the framework for challenges to state 
abortion laws.  
A.  Influential Court Precedent  
In Roe v. Wade, the Court considered a challenge to Texas 
criminal abortion laws that disallowed an abortion except when 
done on medical advice for the purposes of saving the mother’s 
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life.16 There, the issue was whether a woman could terminate her 
pregnancy on her own choice, even though her decision may not 
be based on an attempt to save her life.17 The Court held Texas’ 
criminal abortion statute, which failed to take into account the 
pregnancy stage of the mother or “other interests involved,” was 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.18 The Court reasoned only “personal rights that can 
be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’ . . . are included in [a] guarantee of personal privacy,” and 
that this right to privacy was “broad enough to encompass a 
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”19 
Importantly, in its reasoning the Court acknowledged some state 
regulation is justified in areas that are normally protected by the 
right to personal privacy; for instance, “a State may properly 
assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining 
medical standards, and in protecting potential life.”20 The Court 
reasoned that at some point, “these respective interests become 
sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that 
govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved, 
therefore, cannot be said to be absolute,”21 and the State’s 
interests can become dominant. Thus, out of Roe v. Wade came at 
least two pertinent principles: a woman has a right to obtain an 
abortion without undue governmental interference, and the State 
has a legitimate interest in protecting both the health of a 
woman who seeks an abortion and the life of her unborn child.22 
The holding of Roe v. Wade not only set precedent that provided 
significant guidance to the next major abortion decision, but also 
provided a template to other courts in deciding abortion-related 
cases when the cases involved the right of the mother balanced 
against other state interests.23  
The next foundational abortion case that the Supreme Court 
reviewed followed nineteen years later, in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. There, the Court was faced 
 
 16 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117–18 (1973). 
 17 Id. at 118, 120, 153. 
 18 Id. at 164. 
 19 Id. at 152–53. 
 20 Id. at 154. 
 21 Id.  
 22 Michael P. Vargo, The Right to Informed Choice: A Defense of the Texas Sonogram 
Law, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 457, 461 (2012) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion)).  
 23 See infra note 31. For general examples of other cases using Roe v. Wade, see 
Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000), 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), McCormack v. Hiedeman, 
694 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012), and Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997). 
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with a Due Process challenge to Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control 
Act of 1982.24 The Act was concerned with obtaining proper 
informed consent from a woman before she underwent an 
abortion. Specifically, it required physicians to provide certain 
information to women seeking abortions at least twenty-four 
hours prior to the procedure.25 Prior to the Act taking effect, five 
abortion clinics and one physician who provided abortions sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief against it.26 In a plurality 
opinion, the Court partially affirmed the lower court’s validation 
of the statute and simultaneously employed an analysis “for 
evaluating abortion regulation” in a way that reaffirmed 
Roe v. Wade.27  
The Court in Casey looked to the principles in Roe and 
reasoned that while the decision in Roe respected a woman’s 
choice in her right to an abortion, the Court in Roe had also made 
specific mention of the “‘State’s important and legitimate interest 
in the protection of potential [human] life.’”28 From this 
reasoning, the Court in Casey emphasized the State had an 
interest in promoting well-informed abortion choices “[i]n 
attempting to ensure that a woman [understands] the full 
consequences of her decision . . . [while] further[ing] its 
legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting 
legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and 
informed.”29 Thus, in reaching its holding that the Pennsylvania 
act was in part unconstitutional, the Court made sure to note the 
correct analysis to use in approaching abortion rights issues was 
to acknowledge that a “woman’s interest in having an abortion is 
a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but [that] 
States may regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.”30  
With this kind of reasoning guiding much of the abortion 
debate throughout the years, Casey and Roe aided courts in 
determining many, if not all, of the First and Fifth Amendment 
 
 24 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 25 Vargo, supra note 22, at 460 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 844).  
 26 Id. at 461 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 845). 
 27 Id. at 462 (“[The Court in Casey] rejected Roe’s [sic] rigid trimester framework, 
which prevented nearly all regulation during the first three months of pregnancy. In 
doing so, the Court emphasized that the State may, even at the earliest stages of 
pregnancy, protect fetal life by expressing its preference that women avoid abortion.”). 
 28 Id. at 462 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 871). 
 29 Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. 
 30 Id. at 840. 
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challenges that have assailed recent abortion statutes.31 So far, 
Roe and Casey have both stood the test of time, remain good law, 
and will likely continue to provide significant and informative 
guidance for future abortion debates. In fact, in 2013 one court in 
Oklahoma applied Roe in a case concerning transvaginal 
ultrasounds and concluded a mandatory transvaginal ultrasound 
would put an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion.32 
This case did more than simply illustrate continued reliance 
on Roe among courts, however. The Oklahoma court’s conclusion 
had the effect of suggesting that if mandatory transvaginal 
ultrasounds have already been found to place an undue burden 
on a woman’s right to an abortion, then there may be a 
significant issue with the State influencing a woman’s right to 
reject a transvaginal ultrasound before she can receive an 
abortion. That is, if a woman’s only choice is to submit to a 
transvaginal ultrasound in order to take advantage of her right 
to receive an abortion, the effect of such circumstances may cause 
her to be the subject of a state-mandated search under the 
Fourth Amendment since her consent in permitting the state 
intrusion is only obtained through influencing her eligibility to 
undergo the procedure. 
B.  The Abortion Law in Texas 
Before delving into a deeper discussion regarding whether 
Texas’ abortion statute, as written, could be held 
unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment grounds, it is necessary 
to introduce the actual language effectively mandating the 
potential “state searches” on abortion patients. Texas Health and 
 
 31 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (holding a due process challenge 
to Nebraska’s partial birth abortion statute failed since it was not void for vagueness, did 
not impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion, and therefore did not violate 
Roe or Casey); Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 706 
F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating the Women’s Right to Know Act, which required 
providers to “perform an ultrasound in advance of [an] abortion procedure, to make such 
ultrasound images visible to the patient, and to describe the images to the patient,” 
because it was not narrowly tailored to meet state interests of promoting life or protecting 
abortion patients from coerced abortions). See generally David Zucchino, North Carolina 
Abortion Rules Struck Down by Federal Judge, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014, 5:17 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-north-carolina-abortion-law-20140117 
-story.html (reporting a federal judge’s invalidation of a North Carolina law “that 
require[d] abortion providers to show women seeking abortions an ultrasound and to 
describe the fetus”). 
 32 David G. Savage, Supreme Court Decision Disappoints Abortion Foes, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2013, at A10, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/12/nation/la-na-
scotus-abortion-20131113 (noting that the Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down an 
Oklahoma law requiring mandatory ultrasounds via a transvaginal probe since it put an 
undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion). 
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Safety Code section 171.012 states that before an abortion can 
occur, in order for the patient undergoing the abortion to give 
informed consent, either the physician performing the abortion, 
or the agent of such physician who is a certified sonographer, 
must perform “a sonogram on the pregnant woman . . . [and 
display] the sonogram images in a quality consistent with 
current medical practice in a manner that the pregnant woman 
may view them.”33 The physician must then provide a “verbal 
explanation . . . of the dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the 
presence of cardiac activity, and the presence of external 
members and internal organs.”34 Lastly, the physician must 
make “audible the heart auscultation for the pregnant woman to 
hear . . . [with a] simultaneous verbal explanation of the heart 
auscultation.”35  
On its face, the overly descriptive nature of the information 
to be provided causes some pause as to Texas’ true motivation 
behind implementing these ultrasound requirements. Ultimately, 
however, Texas’ true motivation behind implementing the 
statute is speculative, and its legislation has, to this date, been 
attacked on First and Fifth Amendment grounds only. 
In Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services 
v. Lakey, physicians challenged Texas’ statute—then referred to 
as House Bill 15—on First Amendment grounds, since the 
statute: (1) compelled the physician to take and display sonogram 
images while explaining the results to the pregnant woman; and 
(2) required the woman to certify the physician’s compliance with 
the procedures.36 There, the court held the provisions did not 
violate the First Amendment since the provisions were 
“sustainable under Casey” and were “within the State’s power to 
regulate the practice of medicine.”37 The court relied heavily on 
Casey and reasoned the only fair reading of that case was that 
the “physicians’ rights not to speak are . . . ‘subject to reasonable 
licensing and regulation by the State.’”38 The court further 
reasoned “‘[t]he government may use its voice and regulatory 
authority to show its profound respect for the life within the 
woman’”39 and thus, while the State cannot force a physician to 
 
 33 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2014) (effective Sept. 1, 2011).  
 34 Id.  
 35 Id.  
 36 Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573 (5th 
Cir. 2012).  
 37 Id. at 580. 
 38 Id. at 575 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 
(1992) (plurality opinion)). 
 39 Id. at 576 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007)). 
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speak the State’s ideologies, it can use its “regulatory authority 
to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading 
information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, 
even if that information might also encourage the patient to 
choose childbirth over abortion.”40 Furthermore, since the 
provisions of Texas’ legislation were meant to obtain adequate 
informed consent prior to the abortion procedure, the court 
recognized that “[t]he point of informed consent laws is to allow 
the patient to evaluate her condition and render her best decision 
under difficult circumstances.”41 As a result, “[d]enying her up to 
date medical information [would be] more of an abuse to her 
ability to decide than providing the information.”42 The court 
concluded since the material was to secure informed consent, the 
Texas statute was valid under Casey, as that case allowed the 
State “to regulate medical practice by deciding that information 
about fetal development is ‘relevant’ to a woman’s decision 
making.”43 
Though Lakey concerned a First Amendment challenge to 
Texas’ statute, the case is informative of Texas’ interests in 
enacting such legislation—that is, to obtain the most accurate, 
current, and detailed information possible in order to provide an 
abortion patient with true informed consent before she makes a 
major, life-altering decision. However, as previously stated, this 
seemingly legitimate state interest begins to look suspect when 
one inquires into the method of the ultrasound procedure 
currently being used in Texas.  
C.  Implication of the Fourth Amendment 
When considering that many ultrasounds performed during 
the abortion period (the first trimester) are done with a 
transvaginal probe, the new question becomes whether this state 
intrusion, that essentially creates a search within the body of the 
patient, is legitimate enough to outweigh the patient’s right to 
personal privacy and refusal of the ultrasound. It appears many 
in the political and public sphere have begun to view statutes 
such as Texas’, which implicitly mandate invasive procedures, 
with disdain, or at least with grave concern. For instance, these 
 
 40 Id. at 576–77 (quoting Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 
(8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). 
 41 Id. at 579. 
 42 Id.; see Mary Jean Geroulo, Health Care Law, 66 SMU L. REV. 929, 948 (2013) 
(noting one of the primary conclusions in Lakey was the informed consent laws could not 
“impose an undue burden on . . . women’s right to have an abortion”). 
 43 Lakey, 667 F.3d at 578 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846). 
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statutes have been called everything from state-mandated rape,44 
to potential violations of the Fourth Amendment.45  
In line with many of the concerns expressed in the public, 
private, and political spheres, a Fourth Amendment inquiry is 
not only relevant, but likely imminent. Texas’ current statute 
concerns the State’s interests of informed consent versus the 
individual’s interests in privacy and bodily integrity. It implicitly 
requires transvaginal ultrasounds that, in effect, search the 
womb of a pregnant woman in a way that compromises, and 
potentially violates, her right to privacy. Thus, the reality of 
Texas’ statute is that it might currently be causing abortion 
physicians to commit a violation of a female patient’s Fourth 
Amendment rights each time a transvaginal ultrasound is 
utilized in order to comply with the state’s statute.46 Beyond that, 
not only is the legislation in Texas still operative and impacting 
the lives of women who currently seek abortions, it could be a 
contributor to the beginnings of a national rippling effect based 
on state-wide reaction and concern for the effect of the law, 
ultimately causing states to take action in opposition to similar 
laws.47 Thus, there is a fair chance a Fourth Amendment 
challenge could appear before the Supreme Court in the future. If 
it does, the resulting decision could cause significant changes and 
new additions to abortion arguments and policies. For this 
reason, it is imperative to be informed of the history surrounding 
the Court’s treatment of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in 
relation to bodily intrusions by the State. 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Fourth Amendment provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,  
 
 44 See Carole Joffe, Crying Rape: Pro-choice Advocates Should Quit Calling 
Ultrasounds Rape, SLATE (Feb. 29, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
double_x/doublex/2012/02/transvaginal_ultrasounds_why_pro_choice_advocates_shouldn_
t_call_them_rape_.html. See generally Kelsey Anne Green, Comment, Humiliation, 
Degradation, Penetration: What Legislatively Required Pre-abortion Transvaginal 
Ultrasounds and Rape Have in Common, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171 (2013). 
 45 See Whitehead, supra note 14; see also Le Jeune, supra note 14.  
 46 See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.012–171.0122 (West 2014) 
(effective Sept. 2011). See also Kropf, supra note 3 (noting similar laws in “Oklahoma and 
North Carolina are temporarily enjoined from enforcement”). 
 47 Natalie Villacorta, Shifting Strategies for State Abortion Battles in 2014, POLITICO 
(Jan. 6, 2014, 11:27 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/abortion-battles-shifting-
strategy-101811.html (noting twenty-four states implemented abortion restrictions during 
2013, which may be the reason why other states have responded by directly combating 
restrictions that limit abortion availability—California has acted by passing laws that 
“expand[] access to abortion[s]”).  
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and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.48 
Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment has been applied in 
challenges to criminal law investigations, whereby warrant 
requirements and evidence gathering are not only pertinent, but 
are the object of an allegedly unreasonable search. This is not, 
however, the only context wherein the Fourth Amendment has 
been applied. In actuality, Fourth Amendment inquiries do not 
come into play solely in criminal investigations, or where 
evidence gathering is the primary purpose of the search 
administered. Instead, Fourth Amendment inquiries have also 
been analyzed in cases involving inventory searches, special 
needs searches, and administrative searches; there, the 
“probable-cause approach [to the Fourth Amendment inquiry] is 
unhelpful when [the] analysis centers upon the reasonableness of 
routine administrative caretaking functions, particularly when 
no claim is made that the protective procedures are a subterfuge 
for criminal investigations.”49 This being true, when considered 
in light of the current issue, the Fourth Amendment is in fact 
applicable to Texas’ statute even though the statute is lacking 
any purpose for evidence gathering in connection to criminal 
investigations. However, acknowledgment that the Court could 
review a Fourth Amendment challenge, even without criminal 
issues being involved, only determines whether there is a 
possibility the Supreme Court would agree to decide the validity 
of Texas’ statute on Fourth Amendment grounds. It is only after 
this initial step that the Court will look to a variety of factors and 
inquiries to determine the statute’s constitutional vitality. 
 
 48 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 49 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976); see Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 88 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The traditional warrant 
and probable-cause requirements are waived . . . [where] the evidence obtained in the 
search is not intended to be used for law enforcement purposes.”); Colorado v. Bertine, 
479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987) (detailing that the “policies behind the warrant requirement are 
not implicated in an inventory search . . . nor is the related concept of probable cause”); 
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643–44 (1983) (explaining that inventory searches 
constitute a “well-defined exception to the warrant requirement,” in which the 
reasonableness of such is “determined on other bases” such as a balancing of the search’s 
intrusion on the individual’s interests against the governmental interests in the search); 
Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (reasoning it is “anomalous to say 
that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment 
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, 
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 761, 801 (1994) (arguing the 
text of the Fourth Amendment does not require warrants or even probable cause; it 
simply requires that searches and seizures be reasonable). 
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A.  State Action and Use of State Agents 
In determining whether there is a legitimate Fourth 
Amendment issue to any action against an individual, the Court 
will first ask whether there was a search; next, the Court will 
determine whether the search was the product of government 
action.50  
In the present case involving Texas, one might argue that 
while the answer to the first question is clearly “yes,” the answer 
to the second question is “no.” That is, the physician, not the 
State, is the actor performing the ultrasound, and thus the 
government is not taking action against the individual patient. 
This contention is flawed, however, since Texas physicians are 
acting under a government statute when they attempt to comply 
with the ultrasound requirements provided by the state abortion 
law.51 Thus, the physicians can be viewed as agents of the State, 
acting pursuant to governmental direction. This is supported by 
the fact that “private action [has been considered to] amount[] to 
government action when the totality of the circumstances 
indicates that the private actor was acting as an instrument or 
agent of the government.”52 Here, because physicians are 
performing transvaginal ultrasounds in order to comply with 
mandatory state statutory provisions, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the action of individual physicians, in administering the 
ultrasound, constitutes government action.  
This analysis is similar to the approach taken in 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, where the Court held a hospital 
staff’s practice of testing the urine of pregnant patients to 
determine whether the urine would test positive for drug use was 
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.53 In 
determining whether the Fourth Amendment was applicable to 
the case, the Court reasoned that members of the hospital’s staff 
were “government actors, and [thus] subject to the strictures of 
the Fourth Amendment.”54 Similarly, the physicians of abortion 
clinics in Texas are also likely subject to the Fourth Amendment 
assuming they are state agents, acting on behalf of a 
state-mandated statute.  
 
 50 See generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
 51 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2014) (effective Sept. 1, 
2011). 
 52 DAVID BENEMAN & KATLYN DAVIDSON, ME. FED. DEFENDER’S OFFICE, FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: A PRIMER ON SEARCH & SEIZURE LAW 1 (2010), available at http://ne.fd.org/ 
cja_forms/Fourth%20Amendment%20Primer%20-%20Final.pdf.  
 53 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76, 85–86. 
 54 Id. at 76. 
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However, even assuming Texas physicians performing the 
ultrasounds are acting as state agents, a Fourth Amendment 
challenge could still be rejected by the Court if it is determined 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the 
female patient at the time of the transvaginal ultrasound.55 
B.  Did the Person Hold a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?  
In determining whether or not a search has occurred, the 
Court will look to whether the individual had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the item or place that was searched.56 
This is a “twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”57 With regard to Texas patients undergoing 
transvaginal ultrasounds for purposes of the state’s abortion law, 
it is doubtful anyone, including the Court, would argue a woman 
has no subjective expectation of privacy in her person or bodily 
integrity, or that such expectation of privacy in her reproductive 
organs is one that society would deem unreasonable. However, 
while one could safely argue abortion patients have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their persons, it is imperative to 
remember the “mere fact that the government has intruded upon 
a reasonable expectation of privacy merely tells us that the 
Fourth Amendment is implicated. It does not tell us whether the 
government violated the Fourth Amendment”;58 for that, the 
Court will look to whether the search was reasonable overall.  
C.  Was the Search Reasonable? 
Whether a search is reasonable is a fact-specific inquiry.59 
Determination of such inquiry requires a balancing test whereby 
the State’s interests in the procedure constituting a search are 
weighed against the privacy interests of the individual 
undergoing the search.60 If the individual’s privacy interests 
 
 55 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (reasoning not only was the 
Fourth Amendment applicable, but it was violated, since the individual standing in the 
phone booth subject to the search had a reasonable expectation of privacy that his 
conversations in the phone booth would be kept private). 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 58 Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1172 (2012).  
 59 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973) (stating that whether or not a 
search “is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the 
facts and circumstances of each case”). 
 60 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (noting courts assess the 
reasonableness of a search by weighing “the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
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outweigh the State’s interests in the procedure, the Court will 
find that the search is unreasonable and violates the Fourth 
Amendment.61 A note important for consideration, however, is 
just because the search could have been “accomplished by ‘less 
intrusive’ means” does not automatically invalidate the search on 
reasonableness grounds.62 Therefore, here, simply because 
information required by the statute might be able to be viewed 
via an abdominal ultrasound does not mean Texas’ current 
practice is in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. This leads 
to the ultimate inquiry concerning what arguments the State 
might use to support the validation of its statute, and what 
arguments the individual might offer to illustrate the statute’s 
invalidity. 
III. BALANCING OF STATE VS. INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS: WHO WINS? 
There remains little guidance in determining “what makes a 
search or seizure reasonable,” probably since each inquiry is so 
fact specific.63 Nevertheless, the balancing test the Court will 
engage in to determine the reasonableness of transvaginal 
ultrasonography searches will likely concern a plethora of 
arguments that weigh in favor of both state and individual 
privacy interests. Any inquiry the Court considers, however, will 
first focus on precedent. 
A.  Bodily Intrusions and the Fourth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has indicated the reasonableness of a 
search depends on weighing the individual’s privacy interests 
intruded upon against the degree to which the State requires the 
search in order to promote its governmental interests.64 This 
balancing approach has been applied to bodily intrusions before, 
albeit for evidence gathering purposes.  
 
individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests”). 
 61 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding there was a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment because, while a surgery forcefully performed on a suspect to retrieve 
possible evidence may be “useful” in prosecuting him, its incredibly intrusive nature 
weighs heavily on the suspect’s privacy interests, and therefore outweighs the State’s 
interests in the procedure); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) 
(“The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a 
standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government officials [so as 
to] ‘safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions . . . .’”). 
 62 Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 447. 
 63 Lee, supra note 58, at 1135.  
 64 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300; see Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 (declaring that the 
permissibility of a particular law enforcement or governmental procedure that involves a 
search “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests”). 
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For example, the Court indicated as much in Schmerber 
v. California. Though this case involved a search incident to 
arrest, whereby a sample of the defendant’s blood was forcibly 
taken at a hospital after an automobile accident in order to 
determine his blood alcohol content,65 it was the first time the 
Court made clear that intrusions into the body could be found 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In balancing the 
petitioner’s privacy interests against the State’s interests—that 
is, in maintaining safe highways and prosecuting those who 
endanger others via drunk driving—the Court held there was no 
violation of the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights, given the 
facts and circumstances.66 Significantly, however, the Court 
made sure to acknowledge in its reasoning that the “integrity of 
an individual’s person is a cherished value of our 
society . . . . [T]hat the Constitution does not forbid the States 
minor intrusions into an individual’s body under stringently 
limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more 
substantial intrusions” under other circumstances.67 
Nineteen years later in Winston v. Lee, the Court upheld the 
reasoning in Schmerber and expanded on the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness inquiry concerning bodily intrusions.68 In Lee, the 
petitioner, suspected of attempted robbery, was wounded when 
his victim shot him.69 The victim later identified the petitioner as 
his assailant; at that point, a court order directed the petitioner 
to undergo surgery in order to extract a bullet from his person, in 
hopes of matching the bullet with that of the victim’s gun and 
connecting the petitioner to the robbery.70 The Court held the 
surgery violated the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights and 
was an “example of the ‘more substantial intrusion’ cautioned 
against in Schmerber,” as it “violate[d] [the] respondent’s right to 
be secure in his person.”71 The Court looked to the magnitude of 
the intrusion and reasoned that one significant factor to consider 
was “the extent of intrusion upon the individual’s dignitary 
interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity.”72 Thus, the 
surgical intrusion beneath the petitioner’s skin to remove a bullet 
 
 65 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59 (1966).  
 66 Id. at 772. 
 67 Id.  
 68 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 756. 
 71 Id. at 755. 
 72 Id. at 761. 
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from his body, involuntarily, was held to violate his personal 
privacy and bodily integrity.73 
The analysis used in these cases is quite relevant to the 
procedure being applied as a result of Texas’ abortion statute. 
Here, the Court could find that, similar to the petitioner in Lee, a 
woman’s dignity and rights to privacy are severely compromised 
when undergoing transvaginal ultrasounds as a result of Texas’ 
statute. That is, if it is a violation of one’s privacy to undergo 
involuntary surgery, it may be just as much a violation to cause a 
woman to undergo an invasive procedure whereby a foreign 
object is inserted into an intimate body cavity in order to make 
her eligible to receive an abortion.  
B.  Does the State Have an Interest that Outweighs an 
Individual’s Right to Privacy? 
It must be remembered that Texas’ stated justification for its 
statute is that it ensures adequate informed consent from a 
woman before she undergoes any abortion procedure.74 After all, 
as a preliminary matter, one need only look to Texas’ statute, 
which is labeled “Voluntary and Informed Consent,” to discover 
this intent.75 Due to this, Texas would likely assert the 
ultrasound law “furthers the State’s interests in protecting life by 
providing many women with information about their pregnancy 
they may not otherwise access,”76 including the specific details of 
the fetus.77 Texas might argue the law is essential to protecting 
its interest in the life of the fetus since many women do not 
understand medical options or consequences, and could be too 
embarrassed to inquire further.78 Additionally, Casey provides 
that even though a woman has a right to decide whether she 
wants to end her pregnancy, “it does not at all follow that the 
State is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is 
thoughtful and informed.”79 The State could soundly support its 
argument by noting society that would not wish to have a rule 
where the State is prohibited from informing patients of the 
potential health risks that may accompany their surgeries—or 
other possibly life-altering procedures. For instance, if one were 
to be diagnosed with cancer, society would likely expect, if not 
 
 73 Id. at 766. 
 74 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2014). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Vargo, supra note 22, at 471. 
 77 See HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.012. 
 78 Vargo, supra note 22, at 474.  
 79 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
Do Not Delete 5/22/2015 7:35 PM 
938 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:3 
 
demand, that the physician(s) supervising the patient’s health 
provide the patient with all the information, alternative methods, 
procedures, and bodily statistical analysis gleaned from the 
examination of the patient so as to allow the patient to make the 
most informed decision with how they would like to proceed in 
treatment.80 Additionally, society has already experienced 
regulations that curb individual decisions through state 
implementation of mandated vaccinations, for instance.81 Though 
there has been some recent resistance to this kind of state action, 
in Texas in particular, mandated vaccinations are yet another 
example of a state’s intervention into the healthcare of 
individuals, where patients demand information about the risks, 
benefits, and alternatives to vaccines.82 With this as a backdrop, 
scholars have already reasoned laws like Texas’ could be found 
generally valid under an informed consent justification for the 
following reasons: (1) “the Supreme Court in Casey permitted 
states to enact legislation designed to allow women to make a 
‘mature and informed’ decision about whether to obtain an 
abortion”;83 (2) courts have “demonstrate[d] a great amount of 
deference toward heightened abortion informed consent laws”;84 
and lastly, (3) it is understandable that some women would 
“choose to receive this information”85 and therefore is a 
well-reasoned condition under the informed consent 
requirements. It follows that society already recognizes it is 
reasonable for the State to curb our decisions in some respects 
when it comes to medical treatment.86 
Abortions are recognizably a sensitive subject, but again, as 
Texas would argue, the State has a woman’s best interests at 
heart in providing her with full disclosure in gaining her 
informed consent, even when those interests may require 
 
 80 See Vargo, supra note 22, at 472–73 (“Today, we need not look far to see the 
State’s influence over how we treat our bodies: from controlling cancer patients’ access to 
medicine to the way we dry our hair.”). 
 81 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (explaining there are 
certain times when a state is allowed to exercise its police power in a “way to safeguard 
the public health and the public safety”). “The mode or manner in which those results are 
to be accomplished” is subject to the rule that the state’s statute or regulation cannot 
“contravene the Constitution of the United States, nor infringe any right granted or 
secured by that instrument.” Id. 
 82 See Alexander Burns, Rick Perry’s HPV Mandate Returns to Haunt Him, 
POLITICO (Sept. 13, 2011, 5:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/63441.html 
(detailing the reaction to the suggestion of mandating HPV vaccines as an infringement 
on “parental,” and possibly personal, rights). 
 83 Le Jeune, supra note 14, at 549. 
 84 Id. at 550.  
 85 Id. 
 86 See Vargo, supra note 22, at 472–73.  
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invasive medical procedures. As the State would likely 
acknowledge, when a woman becomes pregnant, not only does 
she often have little information to base an abortion decision on, 
but she may frequently face cultural and interpersonal pressures 
from family, friends, and those around her.87 What the abortion 
law seeks to do is set those pressures aside, if not momentarily, 
in order to give an objective education of the abortion procedure.  
In addition to this, the State may insist that the abortion law 
provides an added caution to women once they are inside of the 
abortion clinic. For many abortion clinics, the setting the women 
are placed in is highly influential in their decision to abort, and if 
the women have little education on the subject, at least showing 
them the ultrasounds attempts to give the women neutral and 
accurate information as to the fetus when she may initially feel 
“all of the individuals around her have an expectation of 
acquiescence.”88 Thus, it could be argued the “Texas Sonogram 
Law,” which ultimately requires transvaginal ultrasounds, is 
“useful because [it] respect[s] a woman’s abortion decision, while 
also ensuring that such decision is based on medical facts and 
knowledge of the procedure.”89 Though courts have usually been 
deferential to the State when Fourth Amendment issues 
involving “reasonable” bodily searches present themselves, this 
deference is usually afforded in the criminal law context.90 
Regardless of the law or crime, however, courts have been willing 
to recognize when a search has gone too far.91 Thus, despite the 
State’s interests, there are significant and compelling arguments 
against the State, ones that also have been recognized and 
supported by the Supreme Court in the past, that can be viewed 
as going to the heart of basic human rights to privacy. 
C.  A Woman’s Privacy Interests  
The foregoing principles related to the policy behind 
“informed choice” in the abortion setting appear to weigh heavily 
in favor of the State’s interests in the reasonableness inquiry 
involving the constitutionality of the use of transvaginal 
 
 87 Id. at 490. 
 88 ELIZABETH RING-CASSIDY & IAN GENTLES, WOMEN’S HEALTH AFTER 
ABORTION: THE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 273 (2d ed. 2003), available at 
http://www.deveber.org/text/chapters/Chap18.pdf. 
 89 Vargo, supra note 22, at 495.  
 90 Lee, supra note 58, at 1147 (explaining that in the criminal law context, 
“reasonableness review as currently applied in the Fourth Amendment context is highly 
deferential, resulting in decisions that usually uphold the challenged governmental 
action”). 
 91  See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). 
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ultrasounds. Nevertheless, some women have attacked Texas’ 
sonogram law, claiming the true purpose behind the law is to 
allow the State to force its own ideologies of protecting fetal life 
onto the decisions of the mother.92 This sentiment can be linked 
to why a woman might desire to refuse the state-mandated 
ultrasound. However, if a woman wants to refuse the procedure, 
but cannot refuse it without jeopardizing the abortion, the 
woman’s right to refuse the ultrasound becomes somewhat 
manipulated by the need for “informed consent.” Regardless of 
concerns that the State is spreading its ideological message, the 
notion that a woman must first submit to a body-cavity search 
can be viewed as offending traditional notions of privacy, bodily 
integrity, and self-autonomy.  
This argument weighs heavily against the State’s interests 
in the reasonableness analysis of the transvaginal ultrasounds. 
In fact, in Winston v. Lee, the Court had factored into its 
reasonableness inquiry the “extent of intrusion upon the 
individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily 
integrity.”93 Remember, there the Court suggested significant 
intrusions upon the individual’s bodily integrity—like surgically 
removing a bullet from the petitioner’s person in order to connect 
him to a crime—degraded one’s entitlement to personal privacy 
and were thus subject to challenges under the Fourth 
Amendment.94 This is likely the strongest argument for women 
who oppose undergoing the transvaginal ultrasounds. Courts 
have recognized that the right to consent to treatment has little 
meaning if the patient cannot refuse any or all treatment, despite 
the consequences.95 Thus, despite the State’s asserted interest in 
providing informed consent, the State’s apparent “disregard for a 
woman’s [actual] consent and [the] elimination of the physician’s 
medical discretion violates the primary principles underlying 
 
 92 See “We Have No Choice”: A Story of the Texas Sonogram Law, NPR (Jan. 22, 
2013), www.npr.org/2013/01/22/169059701/we-have-no-choice-a-story-of-the-texas-sonogr 
am-law (interview with Carolyn Jones) (noting some critics claim the true intent of the 
regulations is to eventually, and “systematically,” end abortions); see also Villacorta, 
supra note 47.  
 93 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985). 
 94 Id. at 762; see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1994), overruled by Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society. It is 
therefore implicit in ‘the concept of ordered liberty’ . . . .”). 
 95 Christyne L. Neff, Woman, Womb, and Bodily Integrity, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
327, 342 (1991) (“The potency of bodily integrity law is made manifest here when the 
state’s interest in, among other things, the ‘sanctity of life’ does not succeed in overriding 
the individual’s interest in bodily integrity.”). 
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informed consent doctrine—personal autonomy[, bodily 
integrity,] and the physician-patient relationship.”96  
Autonomy “presumes that no other person or social 
institution ought to overrule a person’s choice, whether or not 
that choice is ‘right’ from an external perspective.”97 This could 
be interpreted to mean that the principle of self-autonomy 
disallows Texas, or any state, from overriding an abortion 
patient’s choice not to undergo a transvaginal ultrasound, by 
implementing a statute mandating the use of the ultrasound 
prior to the patient’s choice to have an abortion. Indeed, critics 
have opined Texas’ statute “undermines the core philosophy of 
autonomy, because it evidences a disrespect for the choice of the 
woman . . . by forcing her to have an unwanted, physically 
intrusive and medically unnecessary ultrasound.”98 This begins 
to present a question of whether the State is truly concerned with 
educating and obtaining informed consent from the patient, or 
whether it is putting the interests of the fetus first.99 If the latter, 
it could be argued that regardless of the State’s interests in 
informed consent, the right to self-autonomy “extends to the right 
to accept or reject the continuation of a pregnancy.”100 Therefore, 
any woman is entitled to “accept or reject an ultrasound as a part 
of her pregnancy treatment, whether or not she has chosen to 
continue” through the completion of her pregnancy.101 If this 
right is compromised, then a woman’s right to bodily integrity is 
negatively impacted. Thus, there is an inherent conflict between 
the State’s interest in disclosure and a woman’s fundamental 
right to bodily integrity and choice. The two interests are directly 
opposed and cannot coexist without one impairing the other. This 
will remain true regardless of policy decisions by the State to the 
contrary. Texas’ statute causes women to rely on the abortion 
physician and the administration of an unwelcome, invasive 
ultrasound in order to effectuate the State’s assurance of 
informed consent.  
 
 96 Le Jeune, supra note 14, at 558; see Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 
92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body.”), abrogated on other grounds by Bing 
v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). 
 97 Aimee Furdyna, Undermining Patient Autonomy by Regulating Informed Consent 
for Abortion, 6 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 638, 658 (2013) (citing BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 
BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 257 (6th ed. 2008)). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 569–60. 
 101 Id.  
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As will likely be argued by Texas, and as critics of Texas’ 
abortion law will have to concede, states have been allowed to 
regulate certain personal medical decisions in the past, such as 
in the context of abortions and vaccinations,102 and thus, the 
right to bodily integrity and self-autonomy is not always 
dominant. Despite this, what may prove to be significantly 
persuasive to the Court is that “in the past, [bodily integrity has] 
prevailed over the competing state interests involved . . . in the 
abortion debate, including the interest in ‘potential life.’”103  
Certainly, the water becomes murky when considering that 
informed consent is a multi-faceted concept, with sometimes 
competing end goals. On the one hand, one primary purpose of 
informed consent is to require full physician disclosure of 
material information, which in this case is provided by the 
abortion physician. However, another primary aspect of informed 
consent concerns respecting the bodily integrity and 
self-autonomy of the patient by allowing them the right to 
self-determination.104 In superficial terms, it can be defined as “a 
process of communication between a patient and physician that 
results in the patient’s authorization or agreement to undergo a 
specific medical intervention.”105 However, again, a more 
accurate reflection of informed consent is the “fundamental 
value . . . [of] personal autonomy.”106 Thus, the principles of 
self-autonomy, bodily integrity, and self-determination could be 
enough in themselves to cause the Court to lean against Texas’ 
statute and in favor of a Fourth Amendment challenge. After all, 
notions of self-autonomy and bodily integrity are incorporated 
directly into our nation’s legal principles,107 and can be 
considered “inalienable.”108 For these reasons, considering the 
significance of the personal interests involved, as opposed to the 
equally valid state interests in maintaining the statute’s validity, 
the Court may have to decide a difficult case if a Fourth 
 
 102 See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(plurality opinion); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570, 573 (5th Cir. 2012); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (vaccines); see 
also Burns, supra note 82. 
 103 Neff, supra note 95, at 329.  
 104 See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833. See also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 216 
(1991) (noting that Roe, and the cases that followed Roe, were fundamentally concerned 
with a woman’s “right to self-determination”). “Those cases serve to vindicate the idea 
that ‘liberty,’ if it means anything, must entail freedom from governmental domination in 
making the most intimate and personal of decisions.” Id.  
 105 Le Jeune, supra note 14, at 526–27 (citing the American Medical Association). 
 106 Id.  
 107 Neff, supra note 95, at 328–29.  
 108 See State v. Brown, 364 A.2d 27, 29 (N.J. 1976) (“The right to life and security is 
not only sacred in the estimation of the common law, but it is inalienable.”).  
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Amendment issue were to arise in relation to Texas’ statute. 
Essentially the question comes down to which interest, supported 
both by policy and the law, is more significant when considering 
the goal of the Fourth Amendment and its jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the arguments on both sides, and the significant 
importance of maintaining principles of self-autonomy, bodily 
integrity, and personal privacy, it is fair to say a definite answer 
as to whether or not Texas’ statute would violate the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be proclaimed. 
Not only is the law slightly ambiguous as to which interest 
may outweigh the other, but the political and social intensity 
surrounding the issue of abortion could cause additional 
ramifications for consideration. That is, if the Court decides in 
favor of the State, what will be the new parameters for 
determining how significant the interests in bodily integrity and 
self-determination are, and how will these new parameters and 
precedent affect women and other individuals in society in the 
future? If the Court rejects a Fourth Amendment challenge in 
this context, and essentially pronounces that the State’s interest 
in monitoring the abortion decision reaches so far as to give it 
authority to force a transvaginal ultrasound as a condition for a 
desired medical procedure, what other significantly invasive 
procedures might the Court start to view as reasonable? There 
are also concerns for the State, however, if the Court decides 
against a Fourth Amendment challenge. That is, will the State 
experience a significant degree of backlash like that which it has 
similarly experienced regarding mandated vaccinations?109 
Though the Court is not required to consolidate possible conflicts 
such as these when determining constitutional challenges, the 
ramifications of a successful or unsuccessful Fourth Amendment 
challenge to Texas’ abortion statute are nonetheless very real 
and will inevitably demand future attention if a Fourth 
Amendment challenge to Texas’ abortion law is made and 
accepted for review by the Court.  
 
 
 109 See Burns, supra note 82. 
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